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A B S T R A C T   
The aim of this article is to explore the question of ecosystem governance in the Arctic, in light of the potential implications of the ongoing negotiations towards a 
new global treaty on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction for ecosystem governance of the Arctic. A new 
global treaty will have inevitably significant implications for Arctic governance, given that a significant portion of the marine Arctic is located in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. The article explores challenges and options for articulating an effective ecosystem approach to marine Arctic biodiversity conservation against 
the background of diverging negotiating positions on the role of the global treaty in filling governance and regulatory gaps; on the role of regional and sectoral bodies 
in implementing global rules; on the relationship among them, especially in light fo the question of overlapping mandates and competences; as well as in consid-
eration of the work done within the context of the Arctic Council on the ecosystem approach.   
1. Introduction 
The existence of important legal and governance gaps related to 
marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) has 
been the focus of a UN process for almost two decades. In 2003, the UN 
Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the 
Sea (UNICPOLOS) underlined the urgency of developing norms and 
mechanisms aimed at protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems, espe-
cially in areas beyond national jurisdiction.1 In 2004, the General As-
sembly of the United Nations (UNGA) established an Ad Hoc Open- 
ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conser-
vation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction (BBNJ WG).2 In its 2011 report the BBNJ WG rec-
ommended that a ‘process be initiated’ by UNGA that could include, 
among other options, the development of a multilateral agreement 
under UNCLOS on marine biodiversity in areas beyond national juris-
diction.3 The report identified four substantive areas to address ur-
gently, ‘together and as a whole’4: marine genetic resources (MGRs), 
including questions on the sharing of benefits; measures such as area- 
based management tools (ABMTs), including marine protected areas 
(MPAs); environmental impact assessments (EIAs); and capacity- 
building and the transfer of marine technology.5 On the basis of the 
final report of the BBNJ WG, submitted in 2015,6 UNGA decided to 
‘develop an international legally binding instrument under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction’ (ILBI).7 UNGA launched thus a preparatory committee 
(PREPCOM) to ‘make substantive recommendations’ to UNGA on 
☆ The research presented in this paper was funded by Norsk Polarinstitutt Grant nr 66005. 
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1 Report of the Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 26 June 2003, UN Doc. A/58/95, para 98ss.  
2 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 November 2004, UN Doc. A/RES/59/24, para 73.  
3 Letter dated 30 June 2011 from the Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/66/119, 
Annex, Section I “Recommendations”, para 1(a) (hereinafter BBNJ WG 2011 Report).  
4 This expression indicates the goal of pursuing the negotiating agenda as a package deal, that is, either there is agreement on all the elements or no agreement at 
all.  
5 BBNJ WG 2011 Report, para 1(b).  
6 Letter dated 13 February 2015 from the Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to the President of the General Assembly, Annex, Section I 
“Recommendations”, UN Doc. A/69/780, para 1(e) (hereinafter BBNJ WG Reccommendations). 
7 UNGA Res. A/69/292 ‘Development of an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the con-
servation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction’, 19 June 2015. 
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elements of an ILBI.8 The PREPCOM submitted its report in July 2017.9 
The report had two sections, and, importantly, did not reflect 
consensus.10 On the contrary, on many crucial topics there remained 
partial or total divergence of views. Finally, on the basis of the recom-
mendation of the PREPCOM,11 UNGA launched an intergovernmental 
conference (IGC) on December 24, 2017.12 At the time of writing, the 
IGC has held two of the four substantive sessions scheduled in the res-
olution. A third session was concluded on August 30, 2019. IGC-3 rep-
resented a significant change of pace as text-based negotiations finally 
started, on the basis of a draft treaty text prepared by the President of the 
IGC,13 Ambassador Rena Lee. However, this change of pace was not 
matched by substantive progress. This article was written before IGC-3 
took place. It will thus reflect IGC-3 only as necessary to incorporate 
any relevant and/or significant development. 
The ILBI, whose geographical scope is likely to include the high seas 
water column and the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 
(i.e. the Area),14 will have potentially significant implications for the 
marine Arctic, as a large portion of the Central Arctic Ocean lies beyond 
the jurisdiction of any State. Some of these implications will derive from 
substantive rules adopted under the new treaty, especially in relation to 
ABMTs, including MPAs, and EIAs. Others will regulate the relationship 
between the ILBI and existing instruments and frameworks, bodies and 
institutions that have competence or jurisdiction in the Arctic due to 
their regional and/or sectoral scope. Importantly, these implications 
may have significant effects on the options available for articulating and 
implementing ecosystem governance in the Arctic, for the role of Arctic 
coastal States (Norway, Denmark with respect to Greenland, Canada, 
Russian Federation and United States)15 and for the ‘Arctic Council 
System’ in the region.16 Ecosystem governance in particular, while 
important in general for achieving the global objectives of biodiversity 
conservation, is absolutely paramount in the Arctic, given its special 
ecological circumstances and vulnerabilities.17 The Arctic marine envi-
ronment is in fact simultaneously rich in biodiversity and extremely 
vulnerable to human activities and environmental change.18 The 
ecosystem approach is an increasingly important framework for the 
conservation of biodiversity in international law,19 but it has also been 
identified as the key conservation framework by the Arctic Council.20 In 
parallel, the ecosystem approach is also indicated as one of the general 
principles and/or approaches that should guide the new ILBI.21 Yet, the 
institutional arrangements for a new BBNJ treaty remain contested.22 
The Arctic coastal States, additionally, resist a global legal and gover-
nance framework for BBNJ, favoring by contrast a regional approach 
that shall not undermine existing regional and sectoral bodies and in-
stitutions.23 They also remain committed to their role of regional Arctic 
stewards.24 A similar position is held by some of the other members of 
the Arctic Council (notably Iceland), and by States with an active Arctic 
interest, such as China, Japan and South Korea.25 However, there is no 
regional organization dedicated to the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment or biodiversity conservation in the Arctic such a 
regional seas organization (RSO).26 The situation is, in other words, 
complex. 
Against this background, the aim of this article is to explore the 
question of ecosystem governance in the Arctic, in light of the ongoing 
BBNJ negotiations, and of their potential implications. The article is 
structured in the following manner. The next section offers an overview 
of the ecosystem approach, first in general, then in the context of the 
BBNJ process. Section three discusses the ecosystem approach as artic-
ulated by the Arctic Council, and outlines some challenges to its 
implementation. Section four reflects on various options to address such 
challenges, and section five offers concluding remarks. 
2. The ecosystem approach 
2.1. The ecosystem approach in general 
The ecosystem approach is the key management framework for 
biodiversity conservation27 and for fisheries management (which 
8 Ibid.  
9 Report of the Preparatory Committee established by General Assembly 
resolution 69/292: Development of an international legally binding instrument 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, A/AC.287/2017/PC.4/2 (hereinafter PREPCOM Report).  
10 This was explicitly mentioned in the report.  
11 PREPCOM Report, Section III.  
12 UNGA Res. A/RES/72/249 ‘International legally binding instrument under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction’.  
13 UN Doc. A/CONF.232/2019/6 (hereinafter Draft Text).  
14 But the question is not yet settled, ibid.  
15 By which I refer, for the purposes of this article which focuses on the marine 
Arctic, to the Arctic coastal States plus Iceland, as a subarctic coastal state and 
Arctic Council member.  
16 E. Molenaar, ‘Current and Prospective Roles of the Arctic Council System 
within the Context of the Law of the Sea’, 27:3, The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law, 2012, 553.  
17 Including those deriving from lack of sufficient knowledge, see Primicerio 
et al., this issue. 
18 SWIPA Report, AMAP, Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic. Sum-
mary for Policymakers, 2017; P. Wassmann, ‘Arctic Marine Ecosystems in an Era 
of Rapid Climate Change’, 90 Progress in Oceanography 2011, 1–4; M. Fos-
sheim et al., ‘Recent Warming Leads to a Rapid Borealization of Fish Commu-
nities in the Western Arctic’, 5 Nature Climate Change 2015, 673–677; 
Primicerio et al., this issue. 
19 See e.g. V. De Lucia, ‘Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies. The 
Ecosystem Approach in International Environmental Law’, 27:1 Journal of 
Environmental Law, 2015, 91; V. De Lucia, The Ecosystem Approach in Interna-
tional Environmental Law. Genealogy and Biopolitics, Routledge, 2019a.  
20 Arctic Council Arctic Marine Strategic Plan 2014–2024. Protecting Marine 
and Coastal Ecosystems in a Changing Arctic, (Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME), 2013).  
21 Se e.g. PREPCOM Report and President’s Aid to Negotiations, UN Doc. A/ 
CONF.232/2019/1.  
22 K. Kraabel, this issue; Prip this issue.  
23 See on these points e.g. V. De Lucia, ‘Reflecting on the meaning of “not 
undermining” ahead of IGC-2’, March 21, 2019, online: http://site.uit.no/jc 
los/files/2019/03/JCLOS-Blog-21.3.2019-Reflecting-on-the-meaning-of-not- 
undermining-ahead-of-IGC-2-3.pdf. Other Arctic Council Members however, 
such as Sweden and Finland, consistently with their EU member ship, have a 
different view.  
24 ‘The Arctic Ocean is a unique ecosystem, which the five coastal states have a 
stewardship role in protecting’, Illulissat Declaration, 2008. For more details on 
this aspect of Arctic governance see Kraabel, this issue and Prip, this issue.  
25 Which are observers in the Arctic Council, and original signatories of the 
Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA). On the latter see Balton, 
this issue.  
26 There is a regional agreement for fisheries, the CAOFA, see Balton, this 
issue. There is also a RSO such as OPSAR which has competence to a small 
portion of the CAO high seas, but for the purposes of this article OSPAR dos not 
have a sufficiently central role in relation to CAO governance. It is however a 
useful model, as I will discuss in some more detail in section 4.  
27 Decision V/6 “Ecosystem Approach” adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention of Biological Diversity at its Fifth meeting, Nairobi, 
15–26 May 2000, UNEP/COP/5/23; see also. 
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however has a significantly narrower scope),28 and is also an increas-
ingly important concept in other areas of international law.29 
While the ecosystem approach is ambiguous concept susceptible of 
contestations,30 it can be generally described as a ‘strategy for the in-
tegrated management of land, water and living resources’.31 The 
concept translates a number of central insights of the science of ecology 
into law, and it rests, broadly speaking, on four interrelated elements: 
integration, integrity, information and iteration. Integration reflects the 
ecological insight that ‘everything is connected with everything else’32 
and that thus any ecosystem, governance or management regime must 
heed this fact and take a holistic approach.33 This includes, importantly, 
the integration of all cumulative impacts in any management of gover-
nance regime.34 From an ecosystem perspective, additionally, knowl-
edge must extend to the cumulative impacts on an ecosystem from 
activities and/or events located at different spatial and/or temporal 
scales. By focusing on integration, the ecosystem approach also chal-
lenges the traditionally fragmentary approach of (international) law. It 
promises to integrate laws that regulate living resources with laws that 
regulate pollution and degradation of the physical environment; it aims 
at integrating, within a transversal ecosystem perspective, fragmented 
jurisdictional and political boundaries; and it typically aims at inte-
grating the social and the ecological dimensions into a single conceptual 
and operative framework. 
Ecological – or ecosystem - integrity is in many ways the underlying 
goal of the ecosystem approach. While integrity is not always easy to 
concretely identify35 and operationalize,36 it aims at maintaining certain 
key functions, structural elements and composition of ecosystems in 
order to ensure the conservation of biodiversity. Information, in turn, 
refers to the crucial role that knowledge has for the implementation of 
the ecosystem approach. Detailed knowledge of ecosystem processes 
and of baseline conditions are paramount in order to understand key 
stressors and for assessing whether a measure or plan is working (this is 
a significant challenge in the Arctic).37 This last aspect links to the final 
element, iteration. Any conservation measure needs to be iteratively 
assessed so as respond and adapt to changes in existing conditions, to the 
variability of natural processes and to the responses of ecosystems to 
various stressors and to conservation measures themselves.38 
2.2. The ecosystem approach in the BBNJ process 
Not surprisingly, the ecosystem approach appeared very early in the 
BBNJ context. Already the report of the ICP-7 recognized that the 
ecosystem approach would be invaluable to avoid fragmentation,39 and 
to ‘build a global legal regime that allowed for an integrated assessment 
of human activities and their interactions with the marine environ-
ment’.40 The BBNJ WG also reported that several delegations agreed on 
the importance of incorporating widely accepted principles of ocean 
governance, such as the ecosystem approach.41 It was however the 
PREPCOM that more concretely recommended that the text of a future 
ILBI ‘would set out the general principles and approaches guiding’ an 
ILBI, and indicated specifically the ecosystem approach among those.42 
The IGC offers further indication as to the potential role of the ecosystem 
approach in the ILBI, but it is the PREPCOM phase that offers the most 
relevant documentation to date (such as submissions, chair’s docu-
ments, PREPCOM report).43 In the Chair’s Overview of PREPCOM II, the 
ecosystem approach is mentioned twice under the heading ‘possible 
areas of convergence of views’ in relation to ABMTs and cross-cutting 
issues.44 Both the February 2017 Chair’s non-paper and the Stream-
lined Chair’s non-paper, which summarizes the former, prepared 
respectively prior to PREPCOM III and PREPCOM IV to assist delega-
tions, include a definition (taken from a submission by WWF).45 The 
ecosystem approach is also included as guiding principle and/or 
approach under two agenda items, ABMTs and EIAs. The extent of the 
inclusion of the ecosystem approach in the PREPCOM report, however, 
which forms the substantive platform for the IGC negotiations, is limited 
to its being one of the possible guiding principles and/or approaches the 
ILBI ‘could include’.46 
28 See in general FAO, Fisheries Management. The Ecosystem Approach to Fish-
eries. FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries. No 4, Suppl. 2. Rome, 
Food and Agriculture Organizations of the United Nations, 2003.  
29 See e.g. O. McIntyre, ‘The Emergence of an “Ecosystem Approach” to the 
Protection of International Watercourses under International Law’, 13:1 (2004) 
RECIEL, 1; Ecosystem-based adaptation to climate change is being promoted by 
UNEP, UNDP and IUCN, see http://www.ebaflagship.org/.  
30 V. De Lucia, 2015, op. cit; De Lucia, 2019a, op. cit.  
31 Decision V/6 ‘Ecosystem Approach’, Nairobi, 15–26 May 2000, UNEP/ 
CBD/COP/DEC/V/6.  
32 B. Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology, New York, 
Alfred Knopf, 1971, p. 16.  
33 On the need for considering holistically the entire set of complex ecological 
interactions within and across ecosystems see, e.g. Primicerio et al., this issue.  
34 By which it is meant changes to ecosystems determined by a combination of 
past, present and future actions or events, Secretariat of the Convention of 
Biological Diversity, The Ecosystem Approach, CBD Guidelines, 2004.  
35 See in this respect G. De Leo and S. Levin, ʻThe Multifaceted Aspects of 
Ecosystem Integrityʼ, 1:1, Conservation Ecology 1997, 3 and more recently G. 
Steinhoff, ʻEcological Integrity in Protected Areas: Two Interpretations’, Seattle 
Journal of Environmental Law, 3, 2013, 155. There is however a significant 
literature that tries to do precisely that, primarily stemming from the work of 
the Global Ecological Integrity Group, see e.g. L. Westra, ʻEcological Integrityʼ, 
in C. Mitcham (ed.) Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and Ethics, Vol. 2, 
Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005.  
36 For an attempt see R. Kim, and K. Bosselmann ʻOperationalizing Sustainable 
Development: Ecological Integrity as a Grundnorm of International Lawʼ, Re-
view of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, 24:2, 2015, 
194.  
37 Primicerio et al., this issue. 
38 Adaptive management is for example one of the four operational guidelines 
adopted within the context of the CBD as an annex to the Malawi Principles in 
Recommendation V/10 on ʻEcosystem approach: further conceptual elabora-
tionʼ, in the Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, 
Technical and Technological Advice Montreal, 31 January - 4 February 2000, 
Canada, UNEP/CBD/COP/V/10.  
39 ICP-7, para 79.  
40 ICP-7, para 90.  
41 “Outcome of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study 
issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction and Co-Chairs’ summary of 
discussions”, UN Doc. A/69/780, paragraph 22 of the document observed how 
“[s]everal delegations noted that a legally binding agreement should incorpo-
rate widely accepted principles of ocean governance, such as the precautionary 
principle, integrated ocean management and an ecosystem approach”.  
42 PREPCOM Report, Section III, para 1.  
43 Though there is a dearth of submissions that do little more than mentioning 
the ecosystem approach as a suitable guiding principle. Norway is the only State 
that has to date indicated its interest in a detailed elaboration of the ecosystem 
approach in the ILBI. Norway’s submission suggested in fact that the ecosystem 
approach be one of the overall objectives of the ILBI and that it ‘should be clearly 
defined’, Norwegian input December 2016, PREPCOM III, p. 2, http://www.un. 
org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/rolling_comp/Norway.pdf. 
44 Chair’s overview of the second session of the Preparatory Committee, Ap-
pendix 2 and 5 respectively relating to ABMTs and to cross-cutting issues, http 
://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/Prep_Com_II_Chair_over 
view_to_MS.pdf.  
45 Chair’s streamlined non-paper on elements of a draft text of an international 
legally-binding instrument under UNCLOS, p. 6 (http://www.un.org/depts/los 
/biodiversity/prepcom_files/Chairs_streamlined_non-paper_to_delegations.pdf), 
drawing on the submission by WWF Proposed framework and key elements of a 
third UNCLOS Implementing Agreement WWF submission to the BBNJ Pre-
pCom Chair and to DOALOS for PrepCom3, 5 December 2016 (https://www. 
un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/rolling_comp/World_Wildlife_Fu 
nd.pdf).  
46 PREPCOM Report, Section III/1, p. 11. 
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The IGC has already held three of the four scheduled substantive 
sessions. During the first and second substantive sessions (respectively 
IGC-1 and IGC-2) not much progress was made with respect to the 
ecosystem approach, as the attention of the delegations focused else-
where. However, the ecosystem approach remained one of the possible 
guiding principles, both in general, and in relation to specific topics such 
as ABMTs,47 EIAs,48 or MGRs.49 The ecosystem approach received 
especially little attention at IGC-2,50 while its inclusion in the Presi-
dent’s Aid to Negotiations (the document that formed the basis of the 
negotiations at IGC-2),51 merely reflected earlier documents and was 
rather limited.52 Additionally, the President’s draft treaty text circulated 
ahead of IGC-3 no longer mentioned the ecosystem approach in the 
section on guiding principles and approaches, now listed under draft 
article 5.53 Article 5 mentions instead an ‘integrated approach’, which 
may or may not be understood as somewhat equivalent to an ecosystem 
approach, considering the importance of the notion of integration for the 
latter, as discussed in section 2.1. What must be noted, though is that in 
the discussion at IGC-3, there was broad consensus in reintroducing the 
ecosystem approach in draft article 5.54 
However, some of the key elements of an ecosystem approach were 
discussed individually across the negotiating agenda. For example, in 
the context of the working group on EIAs, the question of when an 
assessment would be required attracted much debate. Some delegations 
argued that any EIAs rules adopted in the ILBI should only be applicable 
to activities that take place in ABNJ (the activity-oriented approach); 
others by contrast insisted that every activity that has impacts on ABNJ 
should be covered by the EIAs rules (the impact-oriented approach). 
This is clearly an important question from the perspective of an 
ecosystem approach, as in one case the legal framework would be in-
clusive and cut across maritime zones, and in the other it would remain 
constrained by jurisdictional lines.55 A second example that further il-
lustrates how, even if explicit discussion on the ecosystem approach was 
lacking, some of its elements have been discussed individually under 
different items, relates to cumulative impacts. Cumulative impacts were 
discussed especially in relation to ABMTs and EIAs. The importance of 
the concept of cumulative impacts, which is a crucial element of the 
ecosystem approach, was concisely expressed by the delegation of the 
Federate States of Micronesia, which observed how it is not possible to 
conserve ocean biodiversity without taking into consideration cumula-
tive impacts.56 Yet debates on these points are still open and while some 
positive convergence exists on cumulative impacts (with some 
notable exceptions),57 significant resistance remained in relation to the 
scope of EIAs, to strategic environmental assessment and to inclusive 
ecosystem-oriented language on the part of key delegations. 
For our purposes however, the point to be made is that the ecosystem 
approach remains one of the possible guiding principles that should 
frame the ILBI. The main question then is whether these separate dis-
cussions may lead to a coherent articulation of an ecosystem approach in 
the ILBI. A mere mention as a guiding principle would entail inevitably a 
reference to the concept of ecosystem approach as articulated in inter-
national law. Yet the ecosystem approach is marred by contestations and 
complexities,58 and its role, scope and legal status within the context of 
the law of the sea is not entirely clear.59 Additionally, a question can be 
raised as to how an ecosystem approach in the ILBI may dovetail or 
otherwise conflict with the idea of ecosystem approach articulated 
within the context of the Arctic Council, which, as we shall see in the 
next section, has done important work in that respect. 
3. The ecosystem approach in the arctic: framework and 
challenges 
Regardless of the applicability of the ecosystem approach to the 
marine Arctic as a result of global or regional regimes,60 the ecosystem 
approach has found a specific articulation within the context of the 
Arctic Council. The Arctic Council is an ‘essential’61 yet “soft”62 forum 
for Arctic cooperation on matters related to sustainable development 
and environmental protection. Members are the five Arctic coastal 
States (USA, Russian Federation, Norway, Canada and Denmark/ 
Greenland) as well as Iceland, Sweden, and Finland.63 Additionally, six 
indigenous peoples organizations have permanent participant status, 
and a number of States have been admitted as observers. In relation to 
the ecosystem approach, the Arctic Council, which conducts its activities 
47 Thus e.g. the interventions of the EU, Switzerland and Senegal of 7 
September 2018 in relation to agenda item 4.1 of the President’s aid to dis-
cussions (‘Objectives of area-based management tools, including marine pro-
tected areas’), personal notes taken during participation as observer to the 3rd 
substantive session of the BBNJ (on file with author).  
48 Thus e.g. the interventions of Egypt of 11 September 2018 in relation to 
agenda item 5.8.3 of the President’s Aid to Discussions (‘General principles and 
approaches’), personal notes.  
49 See e.g. Statement by the President of the conference at the closing of the 
first session, UN Doc. A/CONF.232/2018/7, p. 21.  
50 IGC-2 indeed focused mostly on ‘the mechanisms to be built, the processes 
to be developed and the roles of the various actors’, Intergovernmental con-
ference on an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of 
marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction Second ses-
sion, 25 March – 5 April 2019 Statement by the President of the conference at 
the closing of the second session, p. 3, https://www.un.org/bbnj/sites/www.un 
.org.bbnj/files/bbnj_-_igc2_-_presidents_closing_statement_-_advance_unedited_ 
version.pdf.  
51 Aid to Negotiations.  
52 And it was limited to inclusions in the list of possible general principles and 
approaches for the whole ILBI (air to negotiations, p. 8) or in relation to area- 
based management tools and environmental impact assessments (ibid. respec-
tively p. 9 and 10), as one of the possible principles and approaches guiding 
benefit-sharing (ibid. p. 16), and as a reference for the designation of marine 
protected areas (ibid. p. 27).  
53 Draft text of an agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity 
of areas beyond national jurisdiction (hereinafter Draft Text), A/CONF.232/ 
2019/6, p. 7.  
54 IGC-3, Informal working group on cross-cutting issues (arts. 4–6 and 53), 
3–6 p.m., 28 August 2019, personal observation.  
55 UNCLOS however, contains already general rules on impact assessment that 
are applicable across maritime zones, see articles 204–206. 
56 Intervention of the Federated States of Micronesia, 28 March 2019, personal 
notes.  
57 Such as China, April 1, 2019, personal notes.  
58 V. De Lucia, “Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies. The 
Ecosystem Approach in International Environmental Law” 27:1 Journal of 
Environmental Law, 91.  
59 For a detailed discussion of this question see V. De Lucia, ‘The Ecosystem 
Approach and the BBNJ Negotiations’ (July 10, 2019b). Available at SSRN: htt 
ps://ssrn.com/abstract¼3420988.  
60 For example, by virtue of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Fish 
Stocks Agreement, the Convention on Migratory Species, and possibly UNCLOS 
itself (on this see De Lucia, 2019b, op. cit.), as well as the OSPAR Convention, to 
mention the most immediately relevant frameworks. 
61 However, the Arctic Council has increasingly ‘contributed to the develop-
ment of international law relating to the Arctic in terms of law-making and 
implementation’, Y. Takei, ‘The Role of the Arctic Council from an International 
Law Perspective: Past, Present and Future’, The Yearbook of polar law VI 
(2015) 349–374, p. 349.  
62 In the sense that it is not a treaty-based international organization, but a soft 
cooperative arrangement, notwithstanding recent developments, such as the 
creation of a permanent Secretariat; on this see e.g. Takei, op. cit., p. 354–355; 
see also Molenaar, 2012, op. cit. for the role and significance of the Arctic 
Council System. 
63 See Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Joint Commu-
nique of the Governments of The Arctic Countries, Ottawa, Canada, 26 
September 1996. 
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through six working groups, has done important work. In 2004, it 
adopted its Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, and the ecosystem approach 
was therein indicated as the core principle.64 In line with the key ele-
ments presented in section 2.1, the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan defined 
the ecosystem approach in terms of integrative thinking ‘across envi-
ronmental, socio-economic, political and sectoral realms’.65 In 2007, the 
Arctic Council established an expert group on the Ecosystem Approach 
to Management (EA-EG).66 At first the EA-EG’s work proceeded under 
the Working Group on the Protection of the Marine Environment 
(PAME),67 but it was later broadened into a joint expert group including 
the participation of other Arctic Council working groups. In 2009, PAME 
presented a report to the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) in which it 
outlined the importance of the ecosystem approach, including, impor-
tantly, the need to coordinate Arctic conservation measures across ju-
risdictions.68 Later still, in 2013 the Arctic Council adopted the Kiruna 
Principles, which constitutes one part of the concluding report of the EA- 
EG to the SAOs.69 One important notion the Kiruna Principles put for-
ward is that the ecosystem approach is ‘place-based’. Accordingly, the 
relevant geographical areas, that is the units of governance or man-
agement, should be identified on the basis of ecological criteria (this is 
an important point on which I will return in section 4). Relatedly, strong 
emphasis is placed on transboundary perspectives, both in relation to 
international cooperation (transboundary arrangements and/or 
regional mechanisms for cooperation) and in relation to ecological 
linkages (i.e. arctic-non-arctic linkages). In this respect, the report, 
recognizing the need for transboundary cooperation at multiple scales, 
recommended the development of an overarching Arctic goal for the 
ecosystem approach, and to ‘explore ways in which Arctic States can 
cooperate to advance conservation and management of biologically, 
ecologically, and culturally significant areas’.70 Another principle, also 
in line the key elements outlined in section 2.1, underscores the 
importance of cumulative impacts. 
In parallel, PAME developed a map of Large Marine Ecosystems 
(LMEs).71 LMEs should form the basis of, and the key platform for, an 
effective implementation of an ecosystem approach in the Arctic. Among 
these, PAME has identified the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) LME. 
The CAO LME brings however to the fore an important challenge to 
the effective implementation of an ecosystem approach in the marine 
Arctic (and elsewhere), as it raises questions relating to the different 
spatial delineations descending from ecological criteria and from the 
maritime zoning enshrined in UNCLOS. The CAO LME, in fact, is not a 
one-to-one match with the high seas portion of the Central Arctic Ocean. 
That is, not all CAO LME water column lies in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, which in turn means not all of it falls under the geograph-
ical scope of the future BBNJ treaty. The CAO is larger and includes 
portions of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Canada, Norway, 
Denmark/Greenland, and Russia. Additionally, the International Seabed 
Authority (ISA), pursuant to Part XI of UNCLOS, has competence in 
matters of environmental protection for activities in the seabed beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction,72 an area also within the expected 
geographical scope of the ILBI. However, a large portion of the seabed 
underlying the CAO is or will be under national jurisdiction by way of 
the UNCLOS rules pertaining to the extended continental shelf.73 This 
poses further questions of complex institutional cooperation between a 
future BBNJ body, the ISA and coastal States, something indeed envi-
sioned in the Kiruna Principles and in the related recommendations of 
the EA-EG to the Arctic Council in matter of international cooperation.74 
This geographical/jurisdictional fragmentation affecting the Arctic 
(but also other regions, mutatis mutandis) is compounded by a second 
type of fragmentation that comes into play: material scope fragmenta-
tion. This refers to the fact that there exist many global, regional and 
sectoral regimes with limited subject matter applicable in the marine 
Arctic.75 The coordination among them (and between them and the 
BBNJ framework) is another important challenge. Given this challenge, 
a BBNJ Treaty may offer an opportunity to fill regulatory and gover-
nance gaps, and indeed the BBNJ process was initiated precisely with 
this goal. However, Arctic coastal States have repeatedly maintained 
that UNCLOS provides a sufficient legal framework for the marine 
Arctic.76 
IGC-3 was concluded at the end of August 2019, and marked a 
critical point, as delegations engaged for the first time in negotiations on 
the basis of a Draft Treaty text prepared by the President and circulated 
at the end of June.77 The question of finding a balance between a global 
and a regional approach however (one that respects both the need for a 
globally harmonized regime and the mandates, rights and interests of 
regional and sectoral actors – be that international bodies and in-
stitutions or coastal States), has not found yet a solution in the BBNJ 
negotiations.78 Additionally, institutional relations between the BBNJ 
Treaty and existing instruments and frameworks remain unclear and 
contested.79 
One important question in this respect is what role the Arctic Council 
may retain once the ILBI becomes a reality. The production and 
dissemination of scientific knowledge would remain in all likelihood an 
important task of the Arctic Council, and perhaps that is sufficient. 
However, if the Arctic Council is to retain a central role within the new 
architecture set up with the ILBI, it would require a significant trans-
formation. If one considers in fact the current options in the BBNJ ne-
gotiations as regards regional governance arrangements, it appears clear 
how, notwithstanding any possible hybrid solution,80 there are 
64 Arctic Council Arctic Marine Strategic Plan 2014–2024. Protecting Marine 
and Coastal Ecosystems in a Changing Arctic, (Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME), 2013), p.8-9.  
65 Ibid., p. 8.  
66 PAME, The Ecosystem Approach to Management of Arctic Marine Ecosystems, 
https://pame.is/images/03_Projects/EA/Brochure/EA_brochure.pdf.  
67 Nuuk Declaration. The Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council. 
May 12, 2011. Nuuk, Greenland.  
68 PAME Progress Report on the Ecosystem Approach to Arctic Marine 
Assessment and Management 2006–2008. See also, A. Hoel (ed.), Best Practices 
in Ecosystem-based Oceans Management in the Arctic, NPI Report Series n. 129, 
2009, which reviews the ways in which the ecosystem approach is being arti-
culated and implemented in the Arctic council Member States 8 except Sweden) 
in order to extract best practices.  
69 Arctic Council, Ecosystem-Based Management in the Arctic, Report submitted 
to Senior Arctic Officials by the Expert Group on Ecosystem-Based Manage-
ment, May 2013, Annex III, ‘Proposed Recommendations of the Expert Group 
on Arctic EBM’.  
70 Ibid., p. 5.  
71 PAME, ‘Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) of the Arctic Area. Revision of the 
Arctic LME Map’, 15th of May 2013, Second Edition, PAME-led Group of Ex-
perts on the Ecosystem Approach to Management, http://www.pame.is/image 
s/03_Projects/EA/LMEs/LME_revised.pdf. 
72 UNCLOS, article 145.  
73 As Arctic coastal States have made submissions to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to art. 76 UNCLOS and which are still 
pending.  
74 For a visualization of this complex jurisdictional picture I refer the reader to 
the maps prepared at the Centre for Borders Research of the University of 
Durham, https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/Arcticmap2019/ 
Simplified200NMArcticmapJune2019.pdf.  
75 e.g. UNCLOS, CAOFA, NEAFC, OSPAR, IMO, CBD, CMS etc.; see Prip this 
issue for more details.  
76 Arctic Council, Ilulissat Declaration, 2008.  
77 Draft text, cit.  
78 Kraabel, this issue.  
79 On this question, see e.g. V. De Lucia, ‘Reflecting on the meaning of “not 
undermining” ahead of IGC-2’, March 21, 2019, online: http://site.uit.no/jc 
los/files/2019/03/JCLOS-Blog-21.3.2019-Reflecting-on-the-meaning-of-not- 
undermining-ahead-of-IGC-2-3.pdf.  
80 Kraabel, this issue. 
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primarily two scenarios envisioned in the draft text in cases where no 
relevant regional instrument or framework exists. Either the ILBI will 
directly fill existing governance gaps, or a new regional body may be set 
up. In fact, the draft treaty text contains a general provision in draft 
article 6 (3) which sets out that ‘States Parties shall cooperate to 
establish new global, regional and sectoral bodies, where necessary, to 
fill governance gaps’.81 Furthermore, the draft text for article 15 of the 
ILBI in fact, which deals with ‘international cooperation and collabo-
ration’ in the context of the topic of area-based management, contains a 
suggested paragraph 2 (alternative to 1(b) (ii)) that reads as follows: 
Where there is no [existing] relevant legal instrument or framework 
or relevant global, regional or sectoral body to [establish] [desig-
nate] area-based management tools, including marine protected 
areas, States Parties shall cooperate to establish such an instrument, 
framework or body and shall participate in its work to ensure the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of 
areas beyond national jurisdiction.82 
This is all bracketed text, which means it remains a negotiating text 
to be further debated and refined. However, what is of special interest is 
that Arctic States are generally strong supporters of these provisions, as 
indeed are strong supporters of a regional approach to the institutional 
arrangements of the ILBI.83 
The question then becomes whether there currently is a relevant 
regional body that can implement ecosystem-based governance in the 
Arctic within the context set out in the ILBI. Arctic marine governance is 
very fragmented.84 The only organization that have competence – or 
rather that provides a framework - to adopt ABMTs in the CAO is 
currently the International Maritime Organization (IMO), with regards 
to particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSAs).85 PSSAs are however, sec-
toral measures aimed at mitigating impacts on the marine environment 
from shipping. There is no instrument or framework for adopting cross- 
sectoral MPAs in the CAO. The Arctic Council has done important work 
on ABMTs and MPAs,86 but only in terms of scientific knowledge pro-
duction and policy recommendations. The Arctic Council, has in fact, no 
legal personality or formal status as an international organization. As 
such, and regardless of its important role in normative development and 
in facilitating the implementation of international law in the Arctic,87 it 
is highly doubtful, at least prima facie, that it could be considered as one 
of the bodies referred to by the idea of not undermining that has an 
important place in the BBNJ negotiations.88 The Arctic Council is indeed 
not competent to adopt any measures in the high seas portion of the 
CAO, and can only offer recommendations to Arctic States to take action 
in areas within their jurisdiction. In this respect the ILBI would have 
nothing to undermine. Indeed, it is precisely this sort of legal and reg-
ulatory gap that has been the rasion d’etre of the BBNJ process. 
OSPAR and NEAFC have only competence in a tiny portion of the 
CAO, and the newly adopted CAO Fisheries Agreement89 is a regional 
fisheries arrangement90 that only sets out a moratorium which only 
applies to fisheries (which is to a large extent outside the scope of the 
ILBI).91 There is, in other words, an institutional and legal gap in rela-
tion to marine protected areas. The role of the Task Force on Arctic 
Marine Cooperation set up in 2015 was precisely to assess potential 
‘needs for a regional seas program or other mechanism […] for increased 
cooperation In Arctic marine areas’, as well as ‘to make recommenda-
tions on the nature and scope of any such mechanisms’.92 The Task 
Force report recommended that one such mechanism could be a sub-
sidiary body.93 It appears however now that the Task Force will not fulfil 
its mandate in this particular respect.94 This creates in turn a paradox-
ical situation. The Arctic States maintain on the one hand, that UNCLOS 
offers a sufficient legal framework for Arctic governance, on the other, 
are negotiating an ILBI and within that context insist on a regional 
approach to biodiversity governance. This includes the position that, 
when no regional instruments or bodies exist, relevant States should set 
one up. And yet this is precisely what Arctic States do not want to, nor 
manage to do. 
To summarize, the legal, regulatory and institutional fragmentation 
in the marine Arctic remains acute, and the opportunities offered by an 
ILBI are to a significant extent resisted by relevant Arctic States. The 
same States seem however incapable, if not entirely unwilling, to 
address the institutional gap for the CAO. What are the options, against 
this background, for an effective implementation of the ecosystem 
approach in the CAO then? 
4. Options for an ecosystem approach in the arctic in light of a 
future global treaty on BBNJ 
An effective program of conservation of Arctic biodiversity must be 
able to include within its purview all relevant activities in all ecologi-
cally relevant zones, regardless of jurisdictional fragmentation, in line 
with the inherently integrative logic of the ecosystem approach. Since 
the final institutional arrangements that will underpin the ILBI remain 
subject to negotiation and contestations, and since the Arctic Council 
offers important but merely recommendatory advice in relation to the 
implementation of the ecosystem approach in the Arctic, there is space 
and opportunity for reflecting on options for an effective ecosystem 
governance of the marine Arctic across jurisdictional lines. Integration is 
81 Draft text, cit., p. 7.  
82 Ibid., p. 14.  
83 The draft provisions of the President’s draft reflect indeed positions 
expressed during IGC-2. The US for example made it very clear that a global 
overarching framework would not be welcome, and would rather support the 
creation of new organizations where they do not already exists (28 March, 
personal notes); Norway expressed a similar position albeit in a softer tone 
(March 29, personal notes); Iceland suggested a strengthening of the role of 
Regional Seas Organizations (March 29, personal notes). See also Kraabel, this 
issue.  
84 Prip, this issue.  
85 IMO, Revised guidelines for the identification and designation of Particularly 
Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs), Resolution A.982(24) Adopted on 1 December 
2005. Neither the guidelines nor the designation is binding. Individual mea-
sures may be however, I. Jakobsen, Marine Protected Areas in International Law: 
An Arctic perspective, BRILL 2016, p. 390. The Polar Code might also be 
considered an area-based management tool, insofar as it regulates shipping in a 
specific geographical area.  
86 AMSA II(C)/AMSA II(D) Bridging Workshop Report 12–13 June 2013; 
PAME, Framework for a Pan-Arctic Network of Marine Protected Areas, April 
2015.  
87 Takei, op. cit., p. 356.  
88 Aid to Negotiations, para 3. 
89 Balton, this issue. 
90 V. Schatz, A. Proelss and N. Liu, ‘The 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregu-
lated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: A Critical Analysis’ 34:2 
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2019.  
91 Hwoever, see Balton, this issue, which considers CAOFA as effectively an 
ABMT.  
92 That should offer “complementary enhancements to existing Arctic Council 
mechanisms”, Arctic Council Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation, Report 
to Ministers of the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation. Arctic Council Task 
Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation (TFAMC), 2017, p. 1.  
93 Ibid.  
94 D. Balton, ‘Will the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation deliver?‘, The 
Circle: Arctic biodiversity in the spotlight, 2018, https://arcticwwf.org/newsr 
oom/the-circle/arctic-biodiversity/will-the-task-force-on-arctic-marine-cooper 
ation-deliver/; C. Prip, “A global treaty on the conservation and sustainable use 
of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction: threat or oppor-
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the operative keyword. However, levels and modalities of integration 
that can be legitimately framed under the framework of the ecosystem 
approach may vary significantly.95 The rest of this section will offer a 
number of options, with varying degrees of integration. 
4.1. Ecosystem governance through coordination 
One option is to adopt an ecosystem approach that aligns with the 
jurisdictional map of the marine Arctic. In that case, the ILBI would 
adopt an ecosystem approach in the limited sense that conservation 
measures and procedures regulated under its provisions – and especially 
ABMTs/MPAs and EIAs – would have effect only within areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. This would be complemented by an array of other 
measures also reflecting an ecosystem approach but addressing specific 
sectors such as fisheries or adjacent marine areas, such as areas within 
the jurisdiction of Arctic coastal States, that all have some form of 
ecosystem approach.96 This would also reflect the strong version of the 
idea that the ILBI should not undermine existing legal instruments and 
frameworks, as well as global, regional and/or sectoral bodies and in-
stitutions. Additionally, it would reflect the position of Arctic coastal 
States of maintaining the institutional status quo. Yet, while perhaps the 
most feasible option on the table, it raises significant problems insofar as 
the issue of recognition under the ILBI of measures taken by other bodies 
and institutions remains a hotly debated point.97 It also raises a number 
of problems of future coordination. Additionally, this would arguably be 
a missed opportunity for achieving a comprehensive and effective 
ecosystem governance of the CAO. Thus a second, and more strongly 
integrative, option could focus on the idea of compatibility. 
4.2. Ecosystem-based governance through compatibility 
While the ecosystem approach is capable of being implemented 
sectorally and/or regionally, an ecosystem-based governance98 would be 
conceptually closer with the Kiruna principles and the ecological idea of 
LMEs and take a step further towards a stronger coordination across 
jurisdictional lines. The key in this respect is to ensure that conservation 
measures, regardless of the distribution of competences for their adop-
tion in different maritime zones or jurisdictional areas, encompass the 
entirety of the relevant ecological areas. This is the idea of compatibility. 
The BBNJ draft text (as well as earlier iteration of the negotiating doc-
uments since the PREPCOM),99 already contains the notion of compat-
ibility.100 However, it is primarily approached from the point of view of 
adjacent coastal States. Article 15 of the draft text, which regulates in-
ternational cooperation with regards to ABMTs/MPAs, reads in fact that 
‘Measures adopted in accordance with this Part shall not undermine the 
effectiveness of measures adopted by coastal States in adjacent areas 
within national jurisdiction […]’. This reflects the idea of compatibility 
already contained in the Fish Stocks Agreement,101 which sets out that 
‘Conservation and management measures established for the high seas 
and those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be 
compatible’102 to be able to address what is considered a ‘biological 
unity’103 from the point of view of conservation. 
For an effective implementation of the idea of compatibility how-
ever, it would be important to transform it in a key principle of the ILBI. 
In this respect, compatibility would need to entail not only a duty to 
‘take into account’104 measures taken in other maritime zones and/or by 
other instruments and bodies, but a clear duty to adopt compatible 
conservation measures that attaches to all bodies and institutions 
(States, IGOs, global regional and sectoral bodies, etc.) that have 
competence in relation to an identified ecological area, such as LMEs. In 
this respect, compatibility would reflect a particular concretization of 
the general international legal duty to cooperate, and of the more spe-
cific duty to cooperate in ocean matters contained in UNCLOS.105 
In this respect, however, an important variable is the institutional 
architecture that will come out of the negotiations, as it will establish the 
rules and mechanisms for the coordination and interaction among 
existing relevant bodies, instruments, frameworks and mechanisms, 
whether regional, global or sectoral. 
4.3. Thinking like the ocean?106 
But is compatibility enough?107 Perhaps not if the goal is to achieve a 
fully integrated ecosystem governance rather than merely cooperation, 
albeit enhanced, among relevant instruments, bodies and institutions. If 
the relations between a variety of instruments, frameworks and bodies 
operating with a multiplicity of geographical and material scopes is 
approached with the view of ensuring the ILBI does not undermine the 
mandate or competence of other such instruments and bodies, we may 
well be a looking at a lost opportunity. Yet interventions such as the 
statement jointly issued by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) at IGC-2, with the goal of 
asserting their exclusive competence vis-�a-vis the ILBI in matters related 
to their respective areas of competence is precisely an example of that. 
The real opportunity is arguably to rethink governance from the 
perspective of ecosystems.108 This would not entail rewriting the prin-
ciples, rules, rights and obligations of UNCLOS, including its formal 
maritime zoning architecture. It would rather entail rendering effective 
existing rules and principles, such as those contained in Part XII,109 
through their implementation in relation to marine biodiversity across 
sectors of economic activity (including, importantly, fisheries) and 
95 See eg De Luca 2015, op. Cit.  
96 Hoel, 2009, op. cit.  
97 On this see V. De Lucia, ‘Rethinking the Conservation of Marine Biodiversity 
beyond National Jurisdiction – From ‘Not Undermine’ to Ecosystem-Based 
Governance’ 8:4 ESIL Reflections, 2019c.  
98 For the overlapping terminological and conceptual distinctions alluded to 
here see Garcia et al., The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries: Issues, Terminologies, 
Principles, Institutional Foundations, Implementation and Outlook, FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper 443, Food and Agriculture Organization of The United Nations 
Rome, 2003, 21 as well as De Lucia 2019a, op. cit.  
99 See e.g. De Lucia., 2019b, op. cit.   
100 Albeit the term compatibility does not appear any longer in the text, see art. 
15(5) of the Draft text.   
101 Fish Stocks Agreement, article 7 ‘Compatibility of conservation and man-
agement measures’. 
102 Ibid., article 7(2).   
103 Ibid., article 7(2) (d).   
104 As per FSA wording, article 7.   
105 See e.g. UNCLOS, articles 118, 123 and 197.   
106 I am paraphrasing the expression of famous conservationist Aldo Leopold, 
‘thinking like a mountain’, which is also the title of one of the essays in A. 
Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, Ballantine Books (1949) 1986   
107 This section draws on and partly reproduces what already articulated in De 
Lucia, 2019c, op. cit.   
108 OR, as WWF suggests, from a bioregional perspective, S. Grant et al., Bio-
regionalisation of the Southern Ocean: Report of Experts Workshop, Hobart, 
September 2006. WWF-Australia and ACE CRC.   
109 E.g. art. 192, which sets out the general obligation to protect and preserve 
the marine environment, and art. 194(5), which sets out special obligations to 
protect and preserve “rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of 
depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life”. 
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across jurisdictional lines, precisely in the way that an ecosystem-based 
governance framework would demand. 
In this respect, some attempts exist at institutional integration with 
the view of ensuring compatibility of measures and to address gover-
nance gaps taking an ecosystem rather than a merely jurisdictional 
perspective in the face of a fragmented legal and regulatory landscape. 
The Collective Arrangement (CA) adopted in 2014 by the Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(OSPAR) and the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC),110 
is a useful reference in this respect. As organizations with limited subject 
matter competence, OSPAR and NEAFC realized that their goals – which 
include for both the implementation of an ecosystem approach - could 
be achieved more effectively through cooperation with other regional 
and global bodies that have competence in the North East Atlantic. 
OSPAR in particular has signed several Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs) to facilitate cooperation and coordination, including with 
NEAFC, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Inter-
national Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). The CA however 
is a more comprehensive and ambitious cooperation arrangement. Its 
ultimate aim is to become a collective and multilateral forum composed 
of all competent instruments, frameworks and bodies addressing the 
management of human activities in the ABNJ of the North-East 
Atlantic.111 In other words, it is a framework aimed at integrating the 
regional, sectoral and global dimensions in a coherent arrangement for 
decision-making with the view of fostering coordination, complemen-
tarity, compatibility and consistency. This significantly exceeds the idea 
of ‘cooperation’ included in the Draft text,112 which offers a range of 
bracketed options, including the establishment of regional or sectoral 
bodies, consultation processes, unspecified coordination and collabo-
ration mechanisms,113 yet with all options delimited by the constraint of 
“not undermining”. 
Integrating and aligning existing and new bodies and instruments 
within the same institutional framework, and under the ‘constitutional’ 
umbrella of UNCLOS, would ensure not only cooperation among them, 
but also the compatibility of measures adopted under the individual 
regimes through an ex ante as well as ex post coordination. If the ILBI 
were to adopt one such model, it would strengthen the capacity of in-
dividual organizations to achieve their objectives and of individual 
States to fulfil several of their obligations under UNCLOS.114 Addition-
ally, this may facilitate progress in the discussions on the institutional 
arrangements, and ‘help deliver’115 an ecosystem-based governance of 
the oceans – and of the CAO - both within and beyond national juris-
diction, in line with both the general premises of the ecosystem 
approach and the specific framework adopted by the Arctic Council. For 
effective ecosystem-based governance however, any form of CA would 
need to be open to adjacent coastal States in those cases where an 
ecosystem may straddle jurisdictional lines, both horizontally and 
vertically,116 and thus extend to areas located in areas within national 
jurisdiction. Only the participation of coastal States – where relevant - 
would ensure ecosystem-based governance. Such arrangements would 
operate primarily on the basis of ecosystem boundaries and in-
terconnections, rather than of jurisdictional delineations. This would 
however need to be coupled with collaborative, plural and participatory 
decision-making processes, so as to safeguard the rights and facilitate 
the discharge of duties of all existing competent instruments, bodies and 
actors within the general framework set out by, and consistently with, 
UNCLOS. It would probably also facilitate the convergence, over time 
and within coherent ecosystem boundaries, on a number of points that 
remain today incoherent and inconsistent, such as the typologies and 
nomenclature of ABMTs, relevant and effective networks of MPAs and 
criteria for identifications of MPAs – at least where warranted and 
relevant. 
It would also need to facilitate the meaningful participation of 
indigenous peoples, today represented, albeit perhaps imperfectly, 
within the context of the Arctic Council. Within the BBNJ negotiations, 
indigenous peoples’ knowledge about, material engagement and cul-
tural connection with the oceans has received significant attention. 
Nauru, speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum, “called for the 
ILBI to include the role of traditional knowledge (TK) and indigenous 
peoples in the conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ”,117 while the 
Federated States of Micronesia asked for “the connectivity of TK and its 
holders to marine species” to be acknowledged.118 119 There is no space 
for considering how the participation of indigenous peoples could be 
imagined in an ecosystem-based model of governance, but it is impor-
tant to insist on its importance. 
This ecosystem-based model of governance would, finally, take an 
important step towards elaborating a different legal space, an oceanic 
‘lawscape’,120 aligned with ecological realities121 such as have been 
already elaborated in the vision of ecosystem conservation that guides 
the work of the Arctic Council on the ecosystem approach. However, 
110 ‘Collective arrangement between competent international organizations on 
cooperation and coordination regarding selected areas in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction in the North-East Atlantic’, OSPAR Agreement 2014-09 (hereinafter 
CA Agreement) https://www.ospar.org/about/international-cooperation/colle 
ctive-arrangement.   
111 See CA Agreement, Annex II. However, OSPAR and NEAFC remain still the 
only two participants.   
112 And even the more comprehensive language on “enhanced cooperation” 
that was included in the Aid to Negotiations, p. 24.   
113 See e.g. Draft Text, article 15.   
114 Such as the protection and preservation of the marine environment (article 
192) and of cooperation (e.g. articles 118 and 197).   
115 Indeed, OSPAR considers the institutional cooperation reflected in the CA as 
a way to “help deliver an ecosystem approach to the management of all relevant 
human activities in the marine environment”, https://www.ospar.org/about/i 
nternational-cooperation/collective-arrangement. 
116 Such is the case of the Arctic Large Marine Ecosystem identified by PAME, 
whose area includes the EEZ of four coastal States as well as the high seas, 
PAME, ‘Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) of the Arctic Area. Revision of the 
Arctic LME Map’, 15th of May 2013, Second Edition, PAME-led Group of Ex-
perts on the Ecosystem Approach to Management, http://www.pame.is/image 
s/03_Projects/EA/LMEs/LME_revised.pdf, accessed 26 November 2018.   
117 Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), BBNJ IGC-2 Highlights, Volume 25 
Number 186 | Tuesday, 26 March 2019, p. 1.   
118 Ibid, p. 2.   
119 Important contribution in this respect came from pacific Small Islands 
States, as well as from the intervention of observers such as the personal ob-
servations at IGC-2 and IGC-3. Indeed there is even a Friends of Traditional 
Knowledge Group, which includes Norway, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and Maldives, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Third Session of the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the Conservation and Sustainable Use 
of Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, Volume 25 
Number 218 | Monday, 2 September 2019.   
120 See N. Graham, Lawscape. Property, Environment, Law, Routledge, 2011.   
121 Primicerio et al., this issue. 
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such oceanic lawscape would need to take into account the “wet 
ontology” of the oceans,122 that is their fluidity, mobility, becoming, 
their capacity to defy territorial delineations,123 as well as the oceanic 
“excesses”, that “more than wet” ontological space that includes ice and 
air as well as rocks, islands, hydrothermal vents and the ocean floor, as, 
finally, the land-sea interface. 124 If we take seriously the view that the 
“ocean provides a fertile environment for reconceptualising un-
derstandings of space, time, movement, and experiences of being”,125 
governance arrangements must imagined that also accommodate the 
ontological reconsiderations prompted by the oceans. These pose sig-
nificant challenges for the current structure and philosophy of interna-
tional law. UNCLOS offers however a starting point where it recognizes 
how ‘the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be 
considered as a whole’.126 This preambular language, some suggest, 
may implicitly and in nuce articulate an ecosystem vision.127 Addition-
ally, while UNCLOS reflects, in important ways, a traditional view of 
international law, it also contains an “underlying change of conscious-
ness”,128 a potential for its own overcoming, the seeds of a novel legal 
imaginary.129 But can we really imagine a governance model that thinks 
like the ocean, that moves and that reflects oceanic fluidity and at the 
same time takes into account existing institutional and legal constraints? 
5. Conclusions: a “Regional Ecosystem Organization”? 
This article has discussed Arctic marine ecosystem governance and 
the BBNJ negotiations. While the Arctic has never been an explicit topic 
during the BBNJ process – save in the corridors and in some side 
events130 – the BBNJ treaty will have inevitably significant implications 
for Arctic governance, given that a significant portion of the marine 
Arctic is located in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Ecosystem 
governance in the Arctic touches upon a set of issues that span the role of 
a global treaty for a jealously protected regional cooperation framework 
that pivots on the Arctic Council; the role of the latter vis-�a-vis the BBNJ 
treaty; the contradictory position of Arctic States with regards to new 
regional bodies in the Arctic; and the options for articulating ecosystem 
approaches to marine Arctic biodiversity conservation. Of the options 
discussed, the CA offers a useful and concrete model for thinking about 
ecosystem governance. With specific reference to the CAO, however, 
where there is no RSO, and only a preliminary fisheries arrangement 
(the CAOFA), that may take a similar initiative as the CA, the question 
then comes back to two points raised in the course of this paper. On the 
one hand, Arctic coastal States and States with active Arctic interest 
clearly favours a regional approach. This means that the ILBI should 
contain provisions encouraging relevant coastal States to set up regional 
bodies in regions where there currently is none – such as the CAO – so as 
to reduce the role of a global ILBI body. On the other, they also seem 
unable and/or unwilling – especially the Arctic coastal States – to agree 
on stepping up the institutional framework for Arctic cooperation, as 
evidenced by the expected failure of the Task Force on Marine Arctic 
Cooperation with regards to the part of its mandate related to devel-
oping new institutional capacity, although the adoption of the CAOFA 
(which was however negotiated outside of the Arctic Council) may 
signal a shift in orientation. By contrast, the transformation of the Arctic 
Council – or the ex novo constitution of a CAO RSO – could strengthen 
CAO ecosystem governance and, simultaneously, ensure that CAO 
ecosystem governance is overseen and implemented through regional 
institutions, albeit within the global framework set up under the ILBI. 
In this respect, the Arctic States have perhaps a unique opportunity 
to fully concretize their stewardship claim expressed in the Ilulissat 
Declaration,131 and consider with seriousness the idea – and need – to 
establish a RSO – or, even better, a Regional Ecosystem Organization 
(REO) - with a full mandate to implement an ecosystem-based conser-
vation framework across all relevant jurisdictional zones. An REO could 
be conceived as a fluid governance arrangement. An REO should thus be 
able to adapt its participatory base and its decision-making geometry to 
relevant oceanic and ecosystem circumstances. It would also be reflec-
tive of a federative model where incommensurable jurisdictional lines 
and mandates could be integrated and yet could be bridged by particular 
decision-making processes modeled on the idea of concurrent major-
ity.132 There is no space to articulate in full this idea, but the mechanism 
of concurrent majority, described in details by John Calhoun in 1851 in 
the context of the US federal architecture, “excludes the possibility of 
oppression, by giving to each interest, or portion, or order […] the 
means of protecting itself, by its negative, against all measures calcu-
lated to advance the peculiar interests of others at its expense”.133 In 
other words, concurrent majority aims at ensuring that individual or 
minority interests in a federal system of government are not trumped by 
the majority. In the case of an REO, imagined as a federal organization 
whose competence is superimposed, but does not substitute (and thus 
does not undermine) existing jurisdictions and competences, minority 
interests remain able to decide whether to implement rules and mea-
sures adopted at federal level within their jurisdiction. If an MPA is thus 
identified on the basis of global criteria set in the ILBI and operation-
alized by an REO that straddles several jurisdictional boundaries, each of 
the competent bodies or actors participating in the REO would then have 
to concur for its designation, each for the part that falls under their 
jurisdictional space. However, both participation in the REO and the 
general framework set out in UNCLOS would impose certain obligations 
on each federated body, institution or entity that could be procedurally 
and substantively spelt out in the ILBI or in an REO agreement. This 
would not be perhaps such a leap from the current situation, where the 
Arctic Council’s “soft” policy shaping role exerts significant normative 
122 K. Peters, and P. Steinberg, “Volume and Vision: toward a Wet Ontology”, 
39 Harvard Design Magazine, 2014, 124; P. Steinberg and K. Peters, “Wet 
Ontologies, Fluid Spaces: Giving Depth to Volume through Oceanic Thinking”, 
33:2, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 2015, 247.   
123 What Henry Jones calls “the practice of territory”, H. Jones, “Lines in the 
Ocean: Thinking with the Sea about Territory and International Law”, 4:2, 
London Review of International Law 2016, 307, p. 308.   
124 K. Peters and P. Steinberg, “The Ocean in Excess: Towards a more than Wet 
Ontology”, Dialogues in Human Geography, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1177/20 
43820619872886.   
125 Peters and Steinberg, 2019, p. 13.   
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127 For a review of the literature and a discussion of whether and to which 
UNCLOS actually contains such ecosystem vision, see De Lucia, 2019b, op. cit.   
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American Journal of International Law, 1992, 764, p. 784.   
129 Ibid., p. 766.   
130 See Introduction, this issue. 
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American Bar Association Journal, 1983, 482.   
133 J. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, in Works, I (Columbia, 1851), p. 
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pull towards domestic action.134 However, an REO would entail a 
tighter integration of the normative and regulatory levels, and a stronger 
legal anchoring for the REO and its policy making competence. Perhaps 
the future of the Arctic Council could be precisely that of an REO? 
To conclude, by catalysing all relevant actors in the region, a CAO 
REO would go a long way towards enacting the integrative vision un-
derlying the work of the Arctic Council on ecosystem-based 
management, as well as UNCLOS’ seeds of a novel consciousness. It 
would, moreover, begin to reflect ontological wetness of oceanic spaces 
and the plurality of Arctic constituencies beyond the State, by articu-
lating an oceanic version of a post-sovereign environmental governance, 
characterized by being non-exclusive, non-hierarchical, and post-terri-
torial.135 It would, in fact, take us in the direction of a model of 
governance that tries to think like the ocean. 
134 See on this e.g. I. Soltvedt, “Soft Law, Solid Implementation? The Influence 
of Precision, Monitoring and Stakeholder Involvement on Norwegian Imple-
mentation of Arctic Council Recommendations”, 8 Arctic Review of Law and 
Politics, 2017, 73. 
135 B. Karkkainen, “Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance”, 4:1 Global 
Environmental Politics 2004, p.72-96. 
V. De Lucia                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
